Investigation of the Effect of Board Compensation and CEO Power on Firms’ Innovation with the Moderating Role of Ownership Structure
Investigation of the Effect of Board Compensation and CEO Power on Firms’ Innovation with the Moderating Role of Ownership Structure
Abstract
The present study examines the effect of board compensation and CEO power on Firms’ innovation with the moderating role of ownership structure based on data envelopment analysis. The statistical population of the study includes all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, which after sampling amounted to 143 companies and over a 10-year period from 2012 to 2021. The hypothesis testing method in the present study was the use of multiple ordinary regression using R software. The results of the study show that there is a significant relationship between board compensation and firms’ innovation. There is also a significant relationship between CEO power and firms’ innovation. Ownership structure does not moderate the relationship between board compensation and firms’ innovation, and finally, ownership structure does not moderate the relationship between CEO power and firms’ innovation.
Acknowledgments
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